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Descriptionsofthegold standardhavestressedtwo verydifferent aspects
of that monetary system. Modern observers, concerned with high and
rising rates ofinflation, have written enthusiastically and often nostalgi-
cally of the longer-term price stability that existed during the gold stan-
dard era. Many other economists during the past century and a half,
however, have rendered a less kindly judgment, emphasizing instead the
frequent and sometimes severe business contractions that characterized
the period as well as the substantial shorter- and intermediate-term
swings in the price level.
Irving Fisher (1920, p. 65), for instance, phrased his criticism thus:
The chief indictment, then of our present [gold] dollar is that it is
uncertain. As long as it is used as measuring stick, every contract is
necessarily a lottery; and every contracting party is compelled to be a
gambler in gold without his own consent.... One of the results of
such uncertaintyis that price fluctuations cause alternativefluctuations
in business; that is, booms and crises, followed by contractions and
depressions.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the incidence of cyclical
fluctuations within countries adhering to the gold standard and the trans-
mission of these fluctuations among countries. In investigating these
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topics we first review each of the important cyclical contractions in the
United Kingdom and United States during the century 1833-1932. We
then present the results of more formal tests of hypotheses about the
causes ofsuch contractions andtheirdissemination across countries. The
basis of these tests is a vector autoregressive model estimated for both
countries for the combined subperiods 1837-59 and 1882-1914.
The main objective of the historical narrative is to see whether a
monetary explanation of the business cycle is at least broadly consistent
withthedatafor thetwo countries. Todoso we analyze themovementsin
the U.K. and U.S. money and gold stocks, the apparent causes ofthose
movements, andtheirrelationships to oneanotherandto outputoverthe
cycle.
In the course ofthis analysis, we track over territory touched upon to
varying degrees by a number of other authors. Insofar as possible, we
have tried to integrate their accounts with ours. Our analysis, however,
differs from mostofthese earlieranalyses bothin its breadthofcoverage,
spanning both the United Kingdom and the United States and a century
of data, and in its emphasis, being concerned almost exclusively with
cyclical fluctuations and with monetary, as opposed to credit or interest-
rate, data.
The vector autoregressive model and associated hypothesis tests are
directcomplementsofthehistoricalnarrative. Theyenableus toevaluate
in a more rigorous fashion the apparent relationships uncovered by the
simpler historical approach. Again ourchiefconcerns are the association
ofmonetary shocks and cyclical declines in outputwithin each ofthe two
countries and the strength of possible alternative channels of transmis-
sion betweenthe two countries. The latterinclude specie flows, price and
interest-rate arbitrage, asset-market adjustments, and direct absorption
effects.
Since the historical and econometric sections contain separate sum-
maries ofresults and the last section ofthe paperan overall summary, we
skip a detailed synopsis at this juncture. Instead, we merely mention the
two principal findings: monetary shocks were the main source ofcyclical
fluctuations during this period, and the monetary system itself-the gold
standard-wasthe mainmechanismthroughwhich theshocks andassoci-
ated fluctuations in output were disseminated.
10.1 Historical Overview
At the start of our sample period, the United Kingdom was a large
country, London the main financial center ofthe world, and the Bankof
England a central figure in international monetary activity. The United
States, in contrast, started the period as a significantly smaller economy.
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the United States grew rapidly. Immigration rates were high, except for
during the Civil War and major economic depression years, and the
frontier moved steadily westward. As a result, by 1914 the U.S. net
national product was about three times that of the United Kingdom
versus roughly three-quarters that of the United Kingdom in 1834.
In the eighteenth century, the United Kingdom and most other coun-
tries had been on a bimetallic standard, primarily gold and silver. The
United Kingdom restored specie payments in 1821 after the Napoleonic
Wars and remained on the gold standard continuously through 1914.
Then in 1915, with the economic and financial disruptions ofWorld War
I, the United Kingdom left the gold standard and in its stead adopted a
managed fiduciary standard that lasted until the middle of the next
decade. The United Kingdom returned briefly to gold in 1925, this time a
gold-exchange standard, but that system was short lived. In 1931, faced
with the massive balance-of-payments deficits engendered by the defla-
tion then underway in the United States, the United Kingdom left gold
for good.
The United States came to the gold standard later than the United
Kingdom (1834), but stayed on it two years longer. Like the United
Kingdom, the United States too had a temporary break with gold, the
episode beginning in 1862 after the start of the Civil War and lasting de
facto until 1879, de jure until 1900.
Gold during those years remained an official currency along with the
greenbacks issued to finance thewar. TheUnitedStateswas in effectona
dual monetary standard with the price of one currency, greenbacks, in
terms of another, gold, determined by the market. And since gold
remained the international currency, flexible exchange rates prevailed
between the United States and the rest of the world. Only after the
United States deflated its price level did convertibility ofthe dollar with
gold at the pre-Civi"War parity become possible.
The international gold standard that the United States and United
Kingdom participatedin during the period 1834-1914was a mixed rather
than a pure gold standard. Underthe latter, the onlymoneyin use is gold
coins or notes backed by 100 percent gold reserves, and gold is transfer-
red between countries to meet balance-of-payments obligations. The
modified gold standardof1834-1914, however, had many ofthe features
ofa fiat currencysystem: domesticcentral-bankoperations, international
reserve currencies, and domestic fiduciary monies that functioned as
substitutesfor gold coins. Nonetheless, the monetarysystems were oper-
ational gold standards whether pure or not.
Under the modified gold standard, central banks engaged in open-
market operations of buying and selling domestic securities. Some, like
the Bank of England, reputedly "played by the rules of the game,"
permitting the domestic money supply to adjust-in the direction required458 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
for long-run international economic equilibrium.
1 Other central banks,
though, frequently followed temporary policies ofsterilizing gold flows,
buying or selling domestic securities, and hence changing the domestic-
credit component ofthe money supply to offset the monetary effects of
such flows in the short run. Over the longer run, however, the ability to
intervene was necessarily limited unless, ofcourse, as often happened in
time of war, a country left gold and thereby let its exchange rate float.
Under this system, the Bank of England maintained its reserves in
gold, but most other countries held their reserves in gold and sterling
assets. Thus, balance-of-payments adjustments could be made by trans-
ferring currencies and titles to securities and gold in financial centers
rather than by shipping gold per se. Given that London was the world
financial centerandthatsterlingwas a reserve asset, theBankofEngland
could have a significant effect on money supplies abroad via its open-
market operations and manipulations of Bank rate.
10.2 Theoretical Considerations
As an empirical proposition, the link between money and business
fluctuations has long been known to exist. Well before our own era,
monetary economists such as David Hume, Henry Thornton, and Irving
Fisher took this association as a datum, second in importance perhaps
onlytothatbetweenmoneyandthe pricelevel. Thesewriters, moreover,
seem to have beenwell aware ofthe apparent contradiction between the
two relationships. One of the questions they, like modern economists,
sought to answer was how changes in the stock of money, a nominal
variable, couldin thelong run affectonlythepricelevel, anothernominal
variable, but in the short run affect output and employment, real vari-
ables.
The distinction made by Fisher, for one, to rationalize these seemingly
anomalous effects, was between the expected and the unexpected effects
ofmonetarychanges: unexpectedchangesgiving rise to "moneyillusion"
and thereby impinging upon output and employment. In the past two
decades, Milton Friedman (e.g., 1968) has used a similar line ofreason-
ing. Output in this view will fall below its permanent level or unemploy-
ment rise above the natural rate as a consequence of some economic
agents' inabilityto see through monetarilyinducedexpenditure andprice
changes to their ultimate source. In the empirical implementation ofthis
model, a sudden change in the nominal stock of money or in the price
level (or in their rates. of change) is, therefore, the causative variable.
2
Over the past decade, this approach has been extended and otherwise
recast by proponents of the rational-expectations hypothesis. In these
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accountofmore thansimply thepastbehaviorofmoneyortheprice level
in forming their expectations. They are assumed instead to know the
structure of the relevant economic relationships and to make unbiased
forecasts ofthe relevant economic variables. In empirical applications of
this rational-expectations approach, output or unemployment depends
upondeviations in money (orothervariables) from thevalues individuals
predict on the basis of that knowledge.
Until very recently, models of.this sort, with their emphasis upon
expectationsanddynamicadjustment, were almostexclusivelyappliedto
closed economies. The standard models ofopen economies and interna-
tional adjustment that dealt with behavior of output were all in the
Meade-Mundell tradition-static rather than dynamic and devoid ofany
distinction between actual and anticipated values?
Inthe pastseveralyears, however, thetwo strainsoftheliteraturehave
begun to merge. Michael Darby and Alan Stockman (1983) have esti-
mated a simultaneous model for the United States and seven other
industrialized countries during the Bretton Woods era that is consistent
with a natural-rate-rational-expectations approach. AndNasserSaidi, in
two separate theoretical papers (1980, 1982), has applied a rational-
expectations modelto questionsofinternationaltransmission underboth
floating and fixed-exchange-rate regimes.
Underlying our empirical analyses of U.S. and U.K. business cycles
underthegoldstandardis asetofmaintainedhypothesesofa similarsort.
For each country the proximate determinant of output fluctuations was
sudden, unanticipated changes in domestic monetary variables. Trans-
mission between countries occurred mainly via specie flows and the
monetary reactions they induced, either on the part of the monetary
authorities or on the part of the banking system.
An unanticipated decrease in monetary growth in the United King-
dom, for example, initially reduced output growth in the United King-
dom, raised (real) interest rates, produced downward pressure on the
rate of rise of prices, and induced a balance-of-payments surplus and
hence inflows of specie and capital from the United States. Monetary
growth in the United States decreased as a result of the specie outflow,
the real rate of interest rose, and output growth and the rate of rise of
prices fell. After the shocks worked their way through both economies,
output in each returned to a level consistent with its permanent rate of
growth, real interest rates to theirinitial levels, and the nominal stocks of
money to levels consistent with worldwide monetary equilibrium.
Part of the adjustment to the initial monetary deceleration could also
have occurred via price and interest-rate arbitrage. Whether the former
in turn had a depressing influence on output would depend, however,
upon the underlying model. Ifprice shocks rather than monetary shocks460 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
affected aggregate supply, then price arbitrage would be a channel
through which monetary disturbances in one country could have real
effects in another.
4
The alternative view is that cyclical fluctuations in the two countries
resulted from some common real shock. According to this explanation,
contractions in the money stock were an effect rather than the cause of
the declines in income. Declinesin AmericanandBritishrealoutputdue,
say, to decreased demands for their exports on the part ofother nations
led to deficits in the balance ofpayments, gold outflows, and declines in
the nominal stocks of money in·the two countries.
The role of financial panics-an integral part of the history of the
period-also differs according to the two sets of hypotheses. Under the
first, it was purelymonetary. Panicswereshocks largelyifnotcompletely
unrelated to prior income movements. They affected output only via
their impact on the nominal stock of money. Under the second, the
reverse held. Panics resulted from prior declines in income or one ofits
components and were a method by which the requisite reduction in the
nominal stock of money was produced.
5
In pure form, the two sets ofhypotheses are, therefore, competing. In
actuality, one can easily envision a more complex situation, feedback
from income to money, or vice versa, also being of some importance in
the one case or the other.
10.3 Historical Evidence on the Cyclical
Behavior of Money and Output
TheNational BureauofEconomic Research'schronologyofreference
cycles serves as a convenient point of departure for discussion of the
cyclical contractions in the two countries. For the United States, this
chronology begins in 1834, the start ofoursample period; for the United
Kingdom-actually Great Britain-it begins forty-three years earlier.
Table 10.1 lists the calendar-year reference-cycle dates for the two coun-
tries, starting with 1836, the peak in both countries for the first full
contraction encompassed by our data, and ending with the Great De-
pression ofthe 1930s. Inthe UnitedKingdom overthis periodthere were
nineteen reference-cycle contractions. In the United States there were
either twenty-five or twenty-three depending upon the treatment of the
contractions of1847-48 and 1892-94. Ifviewed as distinct entities, as the
officialNBERclassificationdoes, thereweretwenty-five. If, however, we
combine the first with the earlier contraction of 1845-46 and the second
with thatof1890-91,whichis donein thetable andwhich maymakemore
sense from the standpoint ofintercountry comparisons, the total for the
United States reduces to twenty-three.
Oneaspectofthese datathathas attractedattentionis thetendencyfor461 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
Table 10.1 U.S. and U.K. Calendar-Year Reference-Cycle Dates
---------------------- Peak---------------------- --------------------Trough --------------------
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1929 1932
Source: Burns and Mitchell 1946.
Note: Parentheses indicate NBER reference-cycle contractions in the United States, sub-
sumed in our analysis into a longer corresponding cycle for the two countries.
the U.K. reference cycles to lag slightly those in the United States.
Judged in terms of the yearly dates, the lag for peaks and troughs
combinedis approximatelyfour-tenths ofa year. The popularinterpreta-
tion of this lag views it as indicative of a systematic causal relationship
running from the United States to the United Kingdom. We present
evidence later on, however, that contradicts this interpretation, particu-
larly as it applies to the cyclical contractions prior to the Civil War.
Beforewe turntothatevidence, however, it maybeuseful to examinethe
outputand monetary datathemselves. Tothat endwe presenttables 10.2
and 10.3 in which we detail the movements in the neighborhood of
reference-cycle peaks in the United States and United Kingdom, respec-
tively, of business activity and oftwo monetary variables, the monetary
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money stock or, in the case of the United Kingdom prior to 1871,
high-powered money.
Judged on the basis ofthese data, severe business contractions were a
commonoccurrence in bothcountries, in the United States even more so
than in the United Kingdom. During such episodes, output generally
contracted sharply in absolute terms. (Appendix B lists severe contrac-
tions.) In many of the milder NBER reference cycles, however, the
movements are virtually imperceptible: real output actually increased
and at an average rate close to its secular rate ofgrowth. The contraction
that occurred in those episodes was in the rate of growth relative to the
rate in the previous expansion phase rather than in the level ofoutput or
in the rate of growth relative to its secular average.
The most striking feature of the data is the clearcut association be-
tween decreases in the rateofgrowth ofmoney (orhigh-powered money)
and cyclical fluctuations in output. In the great majority ofcycles in both
countries, the monetary stringency preceded or was coincident with the
downturn in output. The degree of stringency, moreover, in general
conformed to the severity of the cycle.
The gold stock often exhibits the same general patterns as M2. The
movements in gold, however, sometimes failed to account for anything
close to thefull movementin M2. Furthermore,in severalinstances there
was little or no correspondence between the two. In many of these
episodes, as the narrative below indicates, the cause of the monetary
decline was a financial panic that reduced the ratios of M2 and high-
powered money to gold.
To investigate these relationships further we turn to the analysis of
severe individual cyclical contractions in the two countries, neglecting
mild cyclical contractions. We divided the sevenepisodes and the accom-
panying narrative into four parts based on their chronological ordering.
As it turned out, these groups are also of some economic significance,
with the direction of transmission between the two countries differing
considerably among the groups. In the antebellum period, the United
Kingdom appears to have exerted the predominant influence. By the
early twentieth century the situation was reversed-the United States
becoming the senior partner in the process, the United Kingdom the
junior.
10.3.1 Antebellum Cycles
The four major antebellum business contractions with which we deal
are those of1836,1839, 1845, and 1857. Allfour were relatively severe in
at least one of the two countries. Most of these severe contractions,
moreover, were accompanied by substantial monetary decelerations.
And all provide evidence ofa causal relationship running primarily from
the United Kingdom to the United States.465 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
1836
According to Burns and Mitchell (1946), the first of the two cyclical
contractions that marked the second half of the 1830s began in both the
United States and the United Kingdom in 1836, ended in the United
Kingdom in 1837 and in the United States a yearlater. In both countries,
monetary factors appeared to have played an important role, with de-
clines in eitherthe stock ofspecie orits rate ofgrowth taking place at the
onsetofthe business declines and a further panic-induceddecrease in the
U.S. money stock accompanying the more protracted and more severe
drop in output there (see appendix B for further discussion). This latter
monetarycontraction, moreover, appearsattributablein largeparttothe
restrictive policies ofthe Bank ofEngland, themselves in turn the result
of the Bank's reaction to the drain of specie.
Byall themeasureswe examined, thecyclical contractionin the United
States was relatively severe: Smith and Cole's (1935) separate domestic-
and foreign-trade indexes fell by average annual rates of5.5 percent and
16.5 percent, respectively, between 1836 and 1838; Ayres's (19"39) index
ofbusinessconditionsatanannualrateoverthesame periodof8percent;
and Gallman's (1966) real-capital-formation series by 13.8 percent be-
tween 1837 and 1838. In the United Kingdom, the contraction was not
only of shorter duration but also apparently much milder, real GNP
falling by 1.5 percent from 1836 to 1837 and then rebounding by 5.6
percent the next year.
Growth in the U.S. money stock began to decline prior to the cyclical
peak and then turned negative: from an increase of 31.5 percent in
1835-36, to 16.9 percent in 1836-37, to - 3.4 percent in 1837-38. Specie
accountedfor all thechange in the rateofchange ofmoneybetween 1834
and 1836. Thenextyear, as a resultofthe bankingpanic, a decrease in the
ratio of M2 to specie became of primary importance.
For the United Kingdom, we have data only for specie and for high-
powered money. The total monetary specie stock exhibits a substantial
decline in each of the years from 1834 through 1836, as do the specie
holdings ofthe Bank ofEngland, the more accurately measured compo-
nentofthattotal. High-poweredmoney, afterdecliningin 1834 and 1835,
increased by just under 1percent in 1836 and justover 1percent in 1837.
According to John Francis's (1862) account, the loss of specie by the
Bank prior to 1836 was a reflection of overseas investments gone sour.
The Bank's specie stock, which in 1833 had reached a high of £10.9
million, fell from an average of£8.2 million in mid-1834 to an average of
£6.2 million in mid-1835. Then in the first quarter of 1836 the Bank's
holdings temporarily rose, only to resume their decline a quarterlater as
pressure from the United States developed.
The Bank's reaction-belatedly, in the eyes of some contemporary466 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
observers-wasto increase its discount ratefrom the4.0percentthathad
prevailed for close to a decade to 4.5 percent in July 1836 and then to 5
percent in September. At the same time, the Bank imposed quantitative
controls, refusing to discount the bills of joint-stock banks or to handle
acceptancesofAnglo-Americandiscount houses (Matthews 1954, p. 58).
Thefirst signs ofa financial crisis in the United Kingdom camewith the
suspension of payments of the Agricultural and Commercial Bank of
Ireland in November 1836 and the near demise of the Northern and
Central Bank, a recently formed Lancashire joint-stock bank. The panic
in the United States began in the spring of1837 with the failure ofa New
Orleans bank. A run soon developed on New York banks and payment
was suspended in May of that year. What heightened the monetary
effects of these actions was the legislation enacted by most states that
prohibited banks that had suspended payments from expanding their
note and deposit liabilities. "Underthese conditions," Clark Warburton
(1962) has claimed, "suspension ofspecie paymentsprovided relieffrom
an immediate banking panic but led to a curtailment of bank loans and
discounts and contraction of bank supplied circulating medium."
Considerable debate has centered around the exact events that trig-
gered the U.S. crisis; the specie circular, the actions of the Bank of
England, and the sharp decline in the price of cotton all figure promi-
nently in the various explanations offered. Those who have emphasized
the first, moreover, ascribe crucial importance to it as a cause of the
business contraction itself.
The monetary data belie that explanation. As we have shown, the first
year of the cycle in the United States was accompanied by a decline in
monetarygrowth thatwas wholly dueto a decline in the rate ofgrowth of
themonetaryspeciestock.
6Thatdecline inturnwas theresultoftheBank
of England's restrictive posture and one of the causes of the ensuing
banking crisis. What added to the pressures on the banking system and
indeed may have been the key exacerbating element was the disburse-
mentoftheTreasurysurplus to state treasuries andhence drain ofspecie
from the banking system (Timberlake 1978). As the U.S. money stock
fell, the economy deteriorated further. That of the United Kingdom,
which has escaped the contractionary monetary effects of the panic,
recovered.
1839
The depression of 1839 was one of the most severe on record in both
countries. Real GNP in the United Kingdom fell for three years running
for a total decline of 7.2 percent, making the depression comparable in
both magnitude and duration to thatof1929-32. In the United Statesthe
contraction lasted a year longer, and, as near as one can tell, was equally
sharp. Smith and Cole's total trade index fell by 21.4 percent from its467 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
peak in 1839 to its trough in 1843; their domestic index fell by 10 percent
over the same period (12 percent from 1839 to 1842); Gallman's capital-
formation series fell by 26.3 percent; and Ayres's index of business
activity declined by 22.0 percent. The only difference, other than dura-
tion, between the U.K. andu.s. contractions was that thelatter appears
tohave beenmadeupoftwo separateepisodes: Allfour real seriesforthe
United States show a substantial drop from 1839 to 1840, a slight pickup
overthe next year (next two in the case ofcapitalformation), and thenin
two ofthe remainingthreeinstances afurther decline ofroughlythe same
magnitude as that of 1839-40.
As in 1836, monetary fluctuations appear to have played important
causative roles in the two countries. In the United Kingdom, both gold
and high-powered money reached peaks in 1838, gold declining by 11.9
percent per annum over the next two years and high-powered money by
6.6 percentperannum. Thenbetween 1840 and 1841 the U.K. gold stock
reversed direction, increasing by 4.4 percent, while high-powered money
remained roughly constant.
In the United States, the monetary contraction began a year laterthan
in the United Kingdom. Gold fell by 6.9 percent and M2 by 11.1 percent
between 1839 and 1840 and continued to decline the following year,
though at slower rates. In 1841-42, the decline in M2 accelerated and the
gold stock fell somewhat further. By the time the trough in both mone-
tary series had been reached,the gold stock had decreased by a cumula-
tive total of 12 percent and M2 by a cumulative total of 32 percent. The
only comparable period of monetary contraction in the hundred years
that our data span is the Great Depression of 1929-33.
The lag between monetary changes in the two countries at the begin-
ning ofthecyclical declines suggests achainofcausationthatranfrom the
United Kingdom to the United States. Historical accounts buttress this
conclusion. In early 1839, the Bank of England began to experience
another specie drain. The cause, according to Matthews (1954), was an
increase in expenditures onimports ofgrain, due in turn to a crop failure
the yearbefore. A contributingfactor, according to some commentators,
was a lack of trust on the Continent in the Bank's ability to maintain
specie payments.
The Bank reacted to the outflow by raising its discount rate in May of
1839 from 4percentto 5percent. By thattime its specie reserve had been
almosthalved, from £9.0 million in Januaryto£5.0million in May. Inlate
Juneit raised Bankrate further to5.5 percent and finally in the beginning
of August to 6 percent. As a result of these actions, out-and-out panic
never really took place in the United Kingdom.
More harmful repercussions ofthe Bank's actions were, however, felt
in the UnitedStates. Interestrates rose markedly, Bigelow'scommercial-
paper-rate series showing an increase from 6 percent in January to 15468 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
percent in August. At the same time, banks in the United States were
losing specie. InJuly, theBankofthe UnitedStates, bythena Pennsylva-
nia-chartered bank, began experiencing trouble. By early October it
failed and a run on Philadelphia banks began. Theysuspendedpayments
in response andbanksin theSouthandWestsoonfollowed suit. TheNew
Yorkbanksheldout, butaccordingtothestatebankcommissionerscited
by Sumner (1896), they experienced a $20 million decrease in their
liabilities in the space of three months ending in late January 1840.
1845
According to the National Bureau's chronology, the United Kingdom
in the second half of the 1840s experienced a three-year contraction,
lasting from 1845 to 1848, and the United States two one-year contrac-
tions spaced oneyear apart. Outputdata, however, tell a different story.
In the United Kingdom, real GNP increased by 6.4 percent from 1845
to 1846 before slowing to an average annual growth rate of slightly less
than 1percentthe next two years. In the United States, Smith and Cole's
trade indexes show peaks in 1844, slight declines between 1844 and 1845,
and then offsetting increases the next year. The level of the total index
(the combination ofdomestic and foreign) was the same in 1847 as 1844;
the·domestic index alone, the same in 1846 as 1844. Between 1847 and
1848 both indexes then decreased substantially, the total by 6.9 percent
and the domestic alone by 5.7 percent. Gallman's capital formation
series, afterrising by 25.7 percentfrom 1845 to 1846, shows a 1.1 percent
increase during the next year and then a 7.4 percent average annual rate
of decline the following two.
In both countries, therefore, the pattern is similar even though the
reference-cycle chronology differs. Whatever contraction took place in
1845-47was relativelymild. Overthenextyear, thesituationworsened-
in the United States apparently by a considerable degree.
The monetary data are in rough agreement with the movements in
output. High-powered money in the United Kingdom rose at an average
annual rate of 4.2 percent from 1844 to 1846 and in the next three years
fell at an average annual rate of 6.1 percent. In the United States, M2,
after rising by 10.4 percentperyearfrom 1842 to 1844, increased by only
4.1 percent per year over the next two, accelerated the following year,
and then declined by 2.6 percent between 1847 and 1848. The only
surprise in the data is that the U.K. recession does not appear to have
been worse, given the amplitude and duration of the monetary contrac-
tion.
Movementsin thegold stockofthe two countriesin generalconformto
those ofthe other monetary aggregates. The U.K. gold stock decreased
slightly between 1844 and 1846, after rising by 14.0 percent per year the469 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
prior two years, and then fell by 2.6 percent per year from 1846 to 1849,
with the largest annual decrease, 9.8 percent, coming in 1847-48. The
U.S. gold stock behaved in like fashion, increasing by 11.3 percent per
year between 1842 and 1844, falling by 2.9 percentperyear overthe next
two years, then increasing by 15.0 percent from 1846 to 1847, and finally
between 1847 and 1848 dropping by 2.6 percent.
Inboth countries, therefore, the decreases in gold in the earlierpartof
the period were at least partially offset while those at the end of the
period led to actual decreases in broader monetary aggregates. As in the
two earlier contractions, the sequence of events seems to have been a
specie drain in the United Kingdom, in this instance, particularlydue to a
trade deficit brought about by the Irish potato famine, subsequent in-
creases in Bank rate (in 1847) to check the drain, and as a result a sizable
gold outflow from the United States.
In the United Kingdom, an exacerbating factor, at least as far as the
monetary situation was concerned, was the widespread financial panic
that began in the summer of 1847 and continued through the fall (see
Dornbusch and Frenkel, this volume). The cause, contemporaryobserv-
ers claimed, was the gold outflow and the Bank's failure to contract its
note issue graduallywhen the outflow began. Sir RobertPeel phrasedhis
criticism thus: "If the bank had possessed the resolution to meet the
coming danger by a contraction of its issues, by raising the rate of
discount, by refusing much of the accommodation which they granted
between the years 1844 and 1846 . . . the necessity for extrinsic interfer-
ence might have beenprevented; it might not have beennecessaryfor the
Governmentto authorize a violation ofthe Actof1844" (MacLeod 1896,
p. 148).
The United States also experienced a panic, though not nearly so
severe as the one in the United Kingdom: "embarrassments were slight
and brief," according to Juglar (1916). The reason, as Warburton (1962)
has pointedout, quite likely was the U.S. Treasury's purchase ofgovern-
ment securities under a resale agreement that offset the initial declines in
the money multiplier.
1856
The business contractions in the late 1850s-1856-58 in the United
States, 1857-58 in the United Kingdom-took on familiar dimensions:
pressure on domestic gold stocks, a reaction by the Bank of England,
panic, and then a monetary contraction in both countries.
Theonlydifference betweenthis andpastcycles was in the accidentals.
The Bank's defensive actions, for example, in this episode came in two
stages rather than the heretofore usual one. Similarly, themajorfocus of
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the 1830s and 1840s. Hence, so also weretheareas-bothgeographicand
economic-in which the most notable bankruptcies and failures
occurred.
The behavior of output requires only slight elaboration. A relatively
severecontractiontookplace in bothcountries. IntheUnitedKingdomit
was brief, but, as reference-cycle dates suggest, in the United States it
was somewhat more protracted.
Thepatternofmovementsin thevariousmonetarytotalswas similarto
that described for earlier cycles. In the United Kingdom, a net gold
inflow, which had produced a 6.3 peryear increase in the monetary gold
stock from 1854 to 1855, ceased the year after, and the gold stock
remainednearlyconstantona yearly basis. Thenin 1857 the drain began,
and gold declined by 5.5 percent. High-powered money behaved in a
virtually identical mannerwith annual rates ofchange of7.2 percent, 1.3
percent, and -6.3 percent in the three years, respectively.
In the United States gold never decreased absolutely, but between
1856 and 1857 it rose by only 2.2 percent after having increased at an
average annualrateof12.6percentin theprecedingthreeyears. Thedata
for M2 show movements similar to those of gold: a 7.7 percent average
annual rateofgrowthfrom 1853 to 1856, a0.9 percentdropthe nextyear,
and then a slight 1.0 percent rise the year after.
These yearlydata, therefore, suggestthattheslowdown in gold inflows
in 1856 was the initiating factor in the cy'clical declines. As its gold
reserves decreased, the Bank.of England raised its discount rate by 250
basis points in the space ofa week in October ofthat year. That, in turn,
intensified the pressure on the United States where banks in New York
and on the rest of the East Coast were already trying to cope with an
internal drain. They reacted by building up their reserves (Temin 1975),
thus adding to the contraction in money. Insolvencies and suspension of
payments followed in the late summer and early fall.
Thepanicand runonthe banksthenspreadto the UnitedKingdom. In
November, even after having raised its discount rate from 5.5 percent to
10 percent in the shortspan offive weeks, the BankofEngland asked for
a suspension oftheBankingActof1844. Suspension allowedit to expand
its note issue, and by December the panic was over. The number of
failures, however, rose considerably. A recessi9n thatinitially had a mild
impact in both countries, intensified and spread, mainly in the United
States.
Given the linkages between the two countries, it is doubtful that the
end result could have beenmuch different in any event. Hadthe Bankof
England not reacted to the pressure on its reserves in 1856, a contraction
in money, and presumably the recession, would have taken place sooner
than that year in the United Kingdom. The Bank's actions merely staved
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States. As the U.S. recession became more and more severe, the feed-
back to the United Kingdom became greater and greater. A panic in the
United Kingdom resulted and recession began there in earnest as well.
10.3.2 The Greenback Period
During the seventeen years the United States was off the gold stan-
dard, the close economic linkages with the United Kingdom that existed
priorto the Civil Warbrokedown. Cyclical fluctuations tookplace atone
time in one country and not in the other. And even in the instances in
which there was a temporal coincidence, the channels through which
these fluctuations might have spread were less than obvious. As illustra-
tions of the two types of episodes respectively, we discuss the U.K.
contraction of 1866 and the coincident contractions of 1873.
1866
The contraction of 1866 and associated panic in the United Kingdom
produced no reaction in the United States. The contrast between this
episode and the four just described thus provides one bit ofevidence on
the role the gold standard played in the transmission of fluctuations
among countries. This evidence, however, is not totally unambiguous.
The contraction in the United Kingdom was not severe. One could
argue-though 1836 seems to run counter to this hypothesis-that the
nonmonetary linkages between the two countries were more important
than the monetary and that their operation, in turn, hinged on the
severity of the initial contraction~
In terms of yearly GNP, the contraction of 1866 to 1868 manifested
itself as a decline in the rate ofgrowth, not an absolute decrease. Com-
mensurate declines occurred in the rates of growth of gold and high-
powered money and in the level of joint-stock-bank liabilities. The
decline in gold, however, came in 1867-68, the second year of the
recession.
The decrease in the ratio ofhigh-powered money to gold and, judging
from Collins's (1981) series for liabilities of joint-stock banks, probably
the ratio of M2 to gold as well, was due to the banking difficulties that
began in early 1866. The cause ofthe decrease, bothClapham (1945) and
MacLeod (1896) claim, was a drain on the Bank's specie reserves that
began in late 1865 and induced the by-then-usual sharp increase in Bank
rate. In February 1866 the first failure occurred, that of the Joint Stock
Discount Company. In March Barned's Bank in Liverpool stopped pay-
ment. The highlight of that decade's panic was, however, the failure of
Overend, Gurney and Company on 10 May with liabilities of over £10
million. The next day, the Banking Act of 1844 was suspended and the
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1873
The contraction of 1873 in the United States by Burns and Mitchell's
reckoning was thelongestonrecord, notending until 1878. Theperiodof
actual decline or sluggish growth in real income, however, was much
shorter-1873 through 1875. From then on, real NNP rose rapidly,
though prices continued to fall.
The panic that took place in September of 1873 in the United States
seems to have been largely domestic in origin. Friedman and Schwartz
(1963b) cite the financial difficulties' of certain U.S. railroads and the
resulting default on their debt as the precipitating factor. What seems to
have set the stage for the panic was the substantial reduction in U.S.
greenbacks andhence in bank-reserve ratios thatoccurredin thefirst half
of 1873.
The United Kingdom escaped the worst part ofthe U.S. panic. Equity
prices were affected which led to a crisis on the London Stock Exchange,
buttherewere no further monetaryrepercussions. TheBankofEngland,
as it hadthroughout 1873, alteredits discount ratepromptly, increasingit
to a high of9 percent on 7 November 1873, and then in the space offour
weeks lowering it back to 5 percent. Peel's Act, contrary to the fears of
the time, was not suspended and a full-fledged panicwas averted. "After
1873," Clapham (1945) states, "neither9, nor 8, nor even 7 percent was
announced again for a whole generation. An occasional 5 and a very
occasional 6 was all that proved necessary."
Therateofgrowth ofM2 slowed appreciablyin the UnitedKingdom in
1873, to 5.6 percent versus 9.3 percent the year before, while the rate of
growth of the monetary gold stock declined by less than a percentage
point during the same period. Real GNP grew at an average annual rate
of2.7 percentin 1873-74, about equal to that of1872. Not until 1875 did
real growth slow to any great extent; but from then until the reference-
cycle trough, its average rate ofincrease was only 0.4 percent per year.
Movements in M2 in the United Kingdom from 1874 ran roughly
parallel to those in real GNP: a further fall in the rate ofincrease ofM2
between 1874 and 1875, near constancy in 1875-76, and then absolute
declines in the stock during the last three years of the contraction.
The cause ofthe restrictive movements in U.K. money was to a large
extent, particularlyin theyears 1873-75, a series ofdeclines in the rateof
growth of high-powered money. These declines in turn were only par-
tially the result ofgold flows. In the later part ofthe period, a decline in
the ratio ofM2 to high-powered money became important? That in turn
appears to have beenthe result ofthe failure ofthe CityofGlasgow Bank
in early October 1878 and the substantial increase in Bank rate in the
middle of that month.
The cyclical contraction of the 1870s, therefore, had two elements in
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gold standard and the channels of transmission of the type that were
important prior to the Civil War appear not to have operated. Unlike
1866, however, thesecontractionsweresevere--onesmallbitofevidence
in favor of our interpretation of 1866. If the sole reason that the earlier
episode was confined to the United Kingdom was its lack of severity,
there ought to have beensome discernible linkages between the cycles in
the two countries in 1873. Thefact thattherewere none,oralmost none,
suggests that the monetarysystem ratherthan moderationoftheepisode
was the key reason there was no transmission to the United States in
1866.
10.3.3 The Heyday of the Gold Standard
TheUnitedStatesreturnedtogold in 1879. Duringthe nextthree-and-
a-half decades the United Kingdom and the United States underwent
threecommonbusiness cycles ofmorethanaverage severity. Noneofthe
three, however, was an exact replica of the antebellum episodes. In the
first, which began in 1882 in the United States and a year later in the
United Kingdom, developments in the UnitedStates affected the United
Kingdom at the start of the cycle; not until later did feedback occur. In
the second, direct links between the two countries seem to have been
minimal. Only in the third, the short-lived but nonetheless substantial
contraction of 1907, was a strong influence running from the United
Kingdom to the United States apparent at the onset of the cycle.
1882
The contractions of the early 1880s were moderately severe in both
countries. In the U.K. contraction, dated 1883-86, real income grew at
an average annual rate of less than 1 percent; in the U.S. contraction,
dated 1882-85, real income was virtually constant for three years as a
whole.
The decline in the rate ofgrowth ofthe U.S. money stock was particu-
larly dramatic. The rate fell from an average of 19.3 percent per year in
1879-81, to an average of 6.9 percent in 1881-83, to virtually zero in
1883-84-reflectinga similarseries ofdeclinesintherateofgrowthofthe
monetary gold stock.
In contrast, only a mild decrease in rates of growth occurred in the
U.K. money stock during the contraction-in average terms, they were
about a percentage point ·lower in 1883-86 than in 1881-83. High-
powered money, however, declined in absolute terms in each year ofthe
contraction; and the gold stock declined in two of those three years.
The drain of gold from the United Kingdom was the culmination of a
movement that had begun in 1879 and that by 1882 had resulted in a
cumulative decrease of close to 10 percent. The direction of movement
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United States; its cause was poor harvests in most of the world and
exceptionally good ones in the United States.
The response of the Bank of England to these drains was to raise its
discount ratefrom 2.5 percentin April 1881 to 6percentin January 1882.
The end result was a cessation of inflows to the United States and a
diminished rate of outflow, followed by an actual inflow of gold to the
United Kingdom.
According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963b), the reversal ofthe gold
flow was one ofthe factors, along with foreigners' decreased confidence
in investment in the United States and in the country's ability to remain
on the gold standard, that precipitated a short-lived financial panic in
New York in May 1884.
The antebellum problems, therefore, reemerged in the postbellum
period. The major differences were the milder fluctuations in output in
the 1880s episode than in earlier ones and the reversed direction of
causation at the start of the contraction-from the United States to the
United Kingdom rather than the other way around.
1890
The U.K. cyclical decline began in 1890 and ended in 1894, making it
one ofthe longest in that country's history. During the same period, the
United States experienced two contractions: an exceedingly mild decline
between 1890 and 1891 followed by a sharp rise in real growth the next
year, and then a much more severe decline between 1892 and 1894.
The U.S. contraction of1890-91 manifests itselfin the yearly data as a
one-percentage-point decline in the growth ofreal NNP and a four-per-
centage-point decline in the growth of industrial production from their
respective averages during the preceding two years. The money stock
never fell but its growth rate declined. The cause was a gold outflow
broughtabout by ashiftofBritishinvestmenttoArgentinain mid-1890 at
thesametime thatNew Yorkbankswere experiencingthe usual seasonal
drain ofspecie reserves to agricultural areas ofthe country. As a result, a
number of bank failures in the United States occurred during early
November, and then on 15 November Baring Brothers, a major British
merchant bank, suspended payment and the panic intensified.
A month later, the panic in the United States was over. In the United
Kingdom, it threatened to become severe but never did. The Bank of
England immediately prior to the demise ofBarings, as it became cogni-
zant ofwhatwas likely to happen, raised the discount rate from 5percent
to 6 percent. Early the next week, it borrowed £0.3 million in gold from
the Banquede France andbought another£1.5 million from Russia, thus
further bolstering its reserves.
In the initial year ofthe U.K. cycle, the growth ofboth real GNP and
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tion fell by 6.7 percentand real GNPremainedvirtuallyflat. By 1895, the
rebound was underway. Growth in the U.K. money supply for the cycle
as a whole declined, but the major part of that came after 1892. Hence,
even though the reference-cycle dates differ between the two countries,
the time pattern of output movements did not.
In the United States, gold movements figured prominently in the
explanation ofmovements in the money stock as a whole. The monetary
gold stock, after falling by 8.7 percent in 1890-91, increased slightly the
next year and then contracted sharply in 1893. The external drains
reflected distrust ofthe Treasury's ability to maintain silver atparitywith
gold, as well as pricedeflation abroad. Atthesametime, aninternaldrain
took place caused by distrust of the solvency of banks. This distrust, in
turn, hadits roots in the deflation thatdeclines in capital and gold inflows
had brought about earlier.
In the United Kingdom, a reduced gold inflow was associated with the
initial declines in monetary growth between 1891-92 and very likely
1892-93. Thereafter, the nongold component of high-powered money
arithmetically accounted for the low rate of monetary growth.
The U.S. contraction, therefore, quite clearly had international roots,
but not as in many earlier cycles ones that extended directly back to
Threadneedle Street. In the United Kingdom, the links with othercoun-
tries were less obvious.s
1907
The contractions of 1907-8 had many of the earmarks of earlier epi-
sodes. From the spring of 1906 on, by Sayers's (1976) account, it became
more and more evident that financial difficulties were liable to break out
in the United States. In May and again in September of that year the
Bank of England took defensive actions, in both instances increasing
Bank rate from 3.5 percent to 4.0 percent, a decrease having been
effected in June. At the same time, it imposed quantitative restrictions,
refusing to discount paper used to finance American speculation. On 5
October it increased Bank rate further to 5 percent, and then on 19
October to 6 percent, the highest level since the Baring Crisis in 1890.
"These measures," Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p. 156) state,
"served first to reduce, then to reverse, the flow of gold to the United
States, andin this andotherways contributedto a changein theeconomic
situation in the United States."
Thechanges in gold flows, however, only show up to a minor extent in
the annual data. The monetary gold stock in the United States, after
increasing by 4.4 percent per year on average in 1904 and 1905, rose
dramaticallyin 1906, a9.0percentincrease relative totheprecedingyear.
In 1907 the increase was only slightly less-8.8 percent.
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dominated by gold than the money stock itself, registered a 2.8 percent
annualized decrease from May to September 1907 versus an 8.4 percent
annualized decrease in the stock of money. From then until February
1908, the money stock continued to fall (at a 12.3 percent annual rate)
while high-powered money rose continuously. Not until July had money
regained its May 1907 level. The major factor accounting arithmetically
for the decrease in money, therefore, was the panic that broke out on 21
October 1907. The panic in turn was at least to some extent the result of
thepreviousgold outflowandits impactonthereservepositionofbanks.
The contraction in output in the United States, though lasting only a
year, was sizable. Real NNP fell by 11.4 percent from 1907 to 1908 and
industrial production by 17.0 percent.
In the United Kingdom, the movements in both money and income
were considerably more moderate. Real GNP decreased by 1.0 percent,
industrial production by 8.4 percent, and the rate ofmonetary growth by
thesame amountas thatofGNP. Thecause ofthemonetarydeceleration
was a decrease in the rate ofgrowth ofthe monetarygold stock, from 3.4
percent in 1906-7 to 1.7 percent in 1907-8. As in the case ofthe United
States, though, these movements may well have been somewhat more
severe when viewed intrayearly. Bank ofEngland gold holdings, one of
the few such series available, in March 1907 stood at £36 million. After
rising by £2 million between then and September, holdings dropped to a
low of less than £30 million on 4 November.
The Bank's response to this outflow, as in the past, was to increase its
discount rate. Itdid so bysuccessive fifty- andthen a hundred-basis-point
amounts from 4.5 percent in September 1907 to 7 percent on 4 Novem-
ber. These increases, though probably necessary from the U.K. stand-
point, worsened the problem in the United States.
10.3.4 The Interwar Period
Takentogether,thesevereinterwarcontractionsbeginningin 1920 and
1929 provide almost a controlled experiment, the outcome of which
demonstrates the important roles played during business contractions by
monetary fluctuations within countries and by the gold standard in dis-
seminating these fluctuations among countries.
9 In both periods, the
United Kingdom and the United States experienced sharp decreases in
monetary growth beginning before the onset of recession. In 1921, the
U.S. money supply rose while the U.K. money stock declined further.
The rebound in the U.S. economy was both rapid and strong; the
rebound in the U.K. economy was weaker and came later. In 1931 the
United Kingdom broke with. the gold standard, thereby severing the
monetary link with the United States. As a consequence, the United
Kingdom was able to increase its money supply over the next two years,
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the United Kingdom was thus cut short while that of the United States
intensified.
1920
The 1920-21 contractions in the United Kingdom and the United
Stateswere two ofthe most severe one-yearcontractions ofrecord. Both
were accompanied by equally severe monetary contractions. In the
United Kingdom, the annual data show a change in monetary growth of
fourteen percentage points: from 12.1 percent per year in 1919-20 to
- 2.3 percent in 1920-21. In the United States, the monetary decelera-
tion was equally dramatic: from 11.5 percent in the one year to -0.58
percent in the next.
The U.K. monetarycontraction, like that of1873 in the UnitedStates,
was prompted by the desire to return to gold at the pre-World War I
exchange rate. Giventheinflationthathadtakenplacein theinterim-an
inflation appreciably greater than in the United States-a substantial
decrease in the U.K. money stockwas necessary. Monthlydatacompiled
by Lothian (1976) show monetary deceleration beginning in June 1919,
nine months before the cycle peak. The peaks in the annual (1920) and
monthly (October1920) money serieswerefollowed by absolute declines
that continued through 1925. In the United States, the money supply
began to grow again in 1922.
The real sides ofthe two economies reacted accordingly. Inthe United
States, both real income and industrial production picked up rapidly,
thereby cancelling out their initial declines a year sooner than in the
United Kingdom. There the process dragged on, and not until 1924 did
both U.K. series return to levels consistent with a modest 2 percent per
year rate of growth. A year later, when the actual return to gold took
place, a new recession began.
The problems of the 1920s in the United Kingdom, therefore, appear
to have been largely monetary in nature. Underlying the monetary
fluctuations in turn were international considerations, in particular the
return to gold at a price consistent with a $4.86/£ exchange rate.
Keynes's assessment in the TreatiseofMoney (1930, 2: p. 181) seemsto
have been essentially correct:
Looking back, we can see that the extreme prolongation ofthe slump
was due to the Profit Deflation which occurred in the first halfof1921.
This was doubtless inspired by the object ofcancellingsome partofthe
Income Inflation of the war and post-war periods ... but from the
standpoint of national prosperity it was a mistake. We might have
avoided most of the troubles of the last ten years . . . if we had
endeavoured to stabilise our monetary position on the basis of the
degree of Income Inflation existing at the end of 1920.478 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
1929
Data for the U.K. money stock at the start of the contraction show a
mild deceleration. Yearly figures indicate a rise of0.6 percentin 1928-29
versus an average rise during the two preceding years of1.8percent. The
monthly data show a somewhat sharper falloff, from 3.2 percent growth
over the twenty-four months ending January 1929-five months prior to
the cycle peak-toa 3.6percentdecline in the moneystockbetweenthen
and January 1930.
From1929 untiltheendofthe cycle, theyearly datashow a sluggish0.6
percent annual rate of increase-an average of 0.8 percent increase in
1929-30,1.2percentdecrease the next year, and 2.3 percentincrease the
year after that. Movements in gold were largely responsible for the
monetary stringency. With the exception of 1929-30 when it rose by 5.4
percent, the monetarygold stock declined in three ofthe four years from
1928 to 1932. Itfell by6.1 percentin 1928-29, by 10.2 percentin 193{}-31,
and then finally by 7.1 percent in 1931-32. Real GNP in the United
Kingdom overthewhole periodfell by 5.7percentandindustrialproduc-
tion by 11.4 percent.
In the United States, the money supply declined by a much greater
amount during the period ofthe U.K. contraction-8.7 percent peryear
from 1929 to 1932. Moreover, it continued to decline at a 2.0 percent
average annual rate from 1932 to 1934. Both real income and industrial
production fell precipitously as a result: real NNP by a total of 34.5
percent from 1929 to 1932 and industrial production by a total of 62.7
percent. The U.S. declines continued into 1933. And, contrary to the
experience of the United Kingdom, neither reached its 1929 level until
almost the end of the decade.
The 1929 contraction thus was marked by a reversal of the U.S. and
U.K. rolesin 1920. Inthe 1920cycle, theUnitedStatesbecameexpansive
earlier and thus escaped the problems thatplagued the U.K. economy in
the 1920s. In the second cycle, the U.K., abandoning gold in 1931, was
able to avoid the further monetary contraction that took place in the
UnitedStates. Asa result,the U.K. economyreboundedmorequicklyin
the 1930s than the U.S. economy did.
lO
Duringbothinterwarcycles, gold was in oneway oranothera key. The
commitment to the return to the gold standard.provided the impetus for
British deflation in the first instance; the abandonment of gold was the
sine qua non for avoidance of further deflation in the second.
10.3.5 Conclusions from the Historical Analysis
Our analysis ofindividual reference-cycle contractions, to our minds,
strdngly suggests that money was an, and most likely the, important
causative factor in the major cyclical contractions in both countries. In
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monetary decelerations and movements in output. That association,
moreover, does not appearto be simply a reflection ofreverse causation.
For one thing the monetary shocks, as we have measured them, in
almost all instancesprecededorwerecoincidentwith thecyclical contrac-
tions. In relatively few instances did the monetary deceleration come
after the fact. Nor do we find it plausible to believe that the association
between money and output is largely the result of some common third
factor that affects both variables. For one thing, the proximate causes of
the monetary declines differed considerably across cycles, suggesting the
absence of any simple mechanism to account for either feedback or the
operation of such a third variable.
Similarly, additional comparisons (described in appendix B) allow us
to rule out one potential and often-suggested candidate-financial
panics. A final bit of evidence is the difference in the incidence and
duration of cyclical fluctuations between gold and non-gold standard
periods. Direct monetary linkages were weaker in the latter; so also was
the association between the cycles in the two countries.
These results also provide evidence on how the transmission mechan-
ism worked. Gold flows clearly were ofdirect importance in a consider-
able number ofepisodes. They also appear to have had an indirect effect
in a number of others, acting as the proximate cause of financial crises
thatin turnledtosubstantialreductions in the ratiosofcommercial-bank-
note and deposit liabilities relative to gold.
The analysis of the individual cycles, however, is rather moot with
respect to other possible channels of influence-price and interest-rate
arbitrage and direct-absorption-type effects on output. It also provides
only limited information on the extent of feedback in the system. In
addition it is almost solely concerned with severe cycles, which according
to Cagan (1965) differqualitativelyfrom theless severe. Atthesametime
it raises a number of questions about the stability of the relationships
between the two countries over time. To try to resolve some of these
issues, we now turn to the more formal statistical investigation.
10.4 Econometric Evidence
We estimate vector autoregressive models for the two countries com-
bined and then use these models as the basis for conducting a series of
tests of Granger causality.11 The advantage of these models is that they
allow for simultaneous dynamic interaction among the variables while at
the same time requiring relatively few identifying restrictions. We view
these traits as particularly desirable in a study such as ours, which is
concerned with short-run adjustment within and between economies of
somewhat uncertain degrees of openness. The models require neither
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ing cross-country channels of transmission and feedback mechanisms
linking within-country variables, nor explicit modeling ofa host ofpossi-
ble alternative dynamic relationships of both sorts.
Given the attention they have received, however, the objections to
these models and the associated Granger tests also require mention.
Foremost among these objections are specification errors of the types
outlinedby Zellner(1979) andby Sims (1982). Havingsomenotionofthe
possible temporal orderings ofvariables under different hypotheses and
initially choosing those variables on the basis of theoretical considera-
tions can reduce the likelihood ofsuch errors andthus limit the effects on
the statistical inferences being made.
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10.4.1 Model and Method
We consider a two-country macroeconomic model that emphasizes
monetary variables. Each variable in the model is represented as a
multivariate vector stochastic process (Sime 1980). In particular, the
general, unrestricted autoregressive-reduced form is:
(1)
where
Xt = 7T'(L) Xt- 1 + Ut, t = 1, ... , T,
(m x 1) (m x m) (m x 1) (m x 1)
(2)
X t [Xt - 1] = a vector containing current (one-period lagged) values ofm
different economic variables (or their rates of change);
7T'(L) = an m x m matrix that contains polynomials in the lag oper-
ator that are one-sided on the past;
Ut = a vector containing a random disturbance for each ofthe m
equations; Ut is multivariate normal with E Ut = 0, and E
UtU; = I.
In this specification, all variables contained in X t are considered
(potentially) endogenous, and in simultaneous-equation terminology,
the set of predetermined variables that are regressors contains only
lagged values of endogenous variables. The set of current exogenous
variables is empty.
This model is used to conduct the Granger tests. To illustrate these
tests in a single-equation context, consider the first equation of the
m-equation system (1):
m
Xlt = 7T'1(L) Xt- 1+ Ult = .I 7T'1j(L) ~t-1 + Ult
J=1
= 7T'11(L)X1t- 1+ 7T'12(L)X2t- 1+ ...
+ 7T'1m(L)Xmt- 1+ Ult, t = 1, ... , T,
where 7T'ij(L) is the (n + 1)th order polynomial in the lag operator
applicable to thejthvariable in theithequation. The null hypothesis that(3)
(4)
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Xmdoes not GrangercauseXl is the restriction that all coefficients ofthe
polynomial lag operator 1T1m(L) [1T12(L) to 1T1m(L)] arezero, i.e., thatall
lagged values of X m are excluded from the equation.
We performthe test thatXmdoes not cause Xl by comparing the error
sum of squares of a model with q linear restrictions imposed on the
coefficients of 1Tl(L) [ESS(w)] with the error sum of squares of an
unrestricted model [ESS(n)]. We use the statistic
F= [ESS(w) - ESS(O)]/q
ESS(n)/[T- k] ,
which has an F-distribution with q and T - k [= T - men + 1)] degrees
of freedom.
13 If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, then X m does not
Granger-cause Xl. If we reject the null hypothesis, then Xm is said to
Granger-cause Xl, and we would like to think there is a behavioral
structure underlying the reduced-form specification ofthe equation sys-
tem (Sims 1980).
We perform these Granger tests in two different contexts: (a) single
equations (univariate models) independentofthe otherelevenequations
in the macroeconomic model system, and (b) two or more equations
jointly within the twelve-equation system (multivariate models). Our
single-equation tests of the null hypothesis that Xm does not Granger-
cause Xl are themselves of two types, weak and strong. The weak tests
are essentially pairwise comparisons in which the "unrestricted" version
of the test equation contains values of only two variables and is of the
form:
Xlt = 1Til (L) Xlt- l + 1Tim (L) Xmt- l
+ Ut t = 1, ... , T
where an asterisk indicates that the relevant terms are part of a two-
variable rather than the more general m-variable system. On this we
impose the restriction that the coefficients of 1Tim(L) are all zero. The
disadvantageofthis testis thatonemightfalsely rejectthenullhypothesis
because ofomittedvariable bias in the estimates of1Ti(L), resulting from
exclusionoflaggedvaluesofX 2 throughX m --...1. Oneormoreofthesemay
be truly Granger-causing Xl, but we could erroneously reach the oppo-
site conclusion if the variable being analyzed were correlatedwith one or
more of the other variables. Accordingly, we also employ a single-
equation strong test that Xmdoes not Granger-cause Xl by imposing the
restrictions on equation (2) that the coefficients of 1Tlm(L) are all zero.
The test tells us whether X m contributes significantly to explaining the
variance in Xl, holding variables X 2 through Xmconstant. Tables 10.4
and 10.5 contain the results ofthese two sets oftests, respectively; table
10.7contains anoverall summaryofthese andofsubsequent test results.































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.484 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
are of two types. The first multiple-cause tests are on each of the single
equations taken independently of the other eleven equations of the
system. In these tests, the unrestricted regression is of the form of
equation(2). Therestriction is thatall coefficientsofall ofthepolynomial
lag operators applying to either all foreign variables or all domestic
variables other than the regressand are zero.
The other multiple-cause tests are tests on two or more equations
jointly. In conducting these tests, we take account of the contempor-
aneous correlations across all twelve equations of our macroeconomic
system. Thesetests are the direct analogues in a multiequationcontextof
thesingle-equationmultiple-causetests justdescribed. Underthevarious
null hypotheses we impose restrictions on entire blocks ofthe coefficient
matrix 71"(L) rather than on portions of one particular row.
The F-statistics for multiple-cause tests on single equations are re-
ported in table 10.6, part A, and chi-squared statistics for joint tests
across two or more equations in part B. For the latter test, we base our
conclusions on Sims's (1980) version ofthe chi-squared statistic, which is
reported in columns (la) and (2a) of table 10.6, but we also report the
other frequently used chi-squared statistic in columns (lb) and (2b).14
To make the model operationalfor the study ofmacroeconomic inter-
relationships between the United Kingdom and the United States during
the gold standard period, we initially assigned the following twelve
variables to the X matrix in equation (1):
YS = U.S. real NNP, orpriorto theCivil Wara proxy
PS = U.S. NNP deflator
FRS = U.S. specie reserves
IS = U.S. short-term interest rate
DCS = U.S. domestic-credit component of high-pow-
ered money
NS = U.S. population
YK = U.K. real GNP
PK = U.K. GNP deflator
FRK = U.K. specie reserves
IK = U.K. short-term interest rate
DCK= U.K. domestic-credit component of high-pow- .
ered money
NK = U.K. population485 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
We used annual data to estimate the model over the combined sub-
periods 1837-59 and 1882-1914.
15 We omitted the Civil War and green-
back periods since the United States was off the gold standard during
those years. Additional observations at the start ofeach subperiod were
lost in differencing and in the process of taking lags.
With the exception of interest rates and monetary variables, we en-
teredall variablesin the model as percentageratesofchange. Forinterest
rateswe usedfirst differencesoflevels andfor the monetaryvariablesfirst
differences of levels scaled by the level of high-powered money. The
latteris equivalent to weighting the percentage rates ofchange ofthe DC
andFR variablesby theirsharesin high-poweredmoney. Ineachinstance
the equations included an intercept term, a dummy variable for the
second subperiod, and two lagged values of each of the independent
variables.
16 We estimated all equations using ordinary least squares. In
our multivariate, multiple-cause tests we do, however, take account of
contemporaneouscross-equationcorrelationoferrorterms. These cross-
equation correlations may capture sources ofbusiness cycle transmission
omitted from the model (table 10.7).
10.4.2 Tests Based upon the Full Model
Since ourprincipal interest is in the real-income tests, we turn to these
first and find the results are rather mixed. In the single-equation weak-
form tests we find some direct influence of monetary variables on real
income in the two countries: FRK is a significant predictorof both YK
and YS, and FRS (as well as PS) approach significance in the YK rela-
tionship. In addition IS, which in turn is influenced by FRS, DCS, and
DCK, significantly affects both YK and YS. In the strong-form tests,
however, mostofthese relationshipsbreakdown: FRSis significant atthe
10 percent level in predicting YK, at somewhat less than the 10 percent
level in predicting YS. Nothing else apparently matters.
The single-equation multicause tests reported in the top half of table
10.6 are even less informative. For both YK and YS we are unable to
reject either the null hypothesis of no-domestic-cause or of
no-other-country-cause.
A number ofpossible reasons can be found for our failure to discover
much in the way ofa relationship here. One is that a strict version ofthe
rational-expectations-natural-rate hypothesis holds (Sargent 1976;
Leiderman 1980). Another is that some subset of the variables-say
foreign reserves and domestic credit-is jointly significant but that the
effects are being masked by the inclusion of a large number of truly
insignificant variables. A third, related to the second, and to which we
return below, is that we have misspecified the monetary variables. A
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.490 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
income in the two countries is that there are common shocks-financial
panics are an obvious example-thatwe have failed to take into account.
In the multivariate multicause tests reported in the bottom of table
10.6, we allow for such shocks by taking account of contemporaneous
cross-equation correlation ofthe errors. In these tests, when eitherofthe
real-income variables is examinedin conjunction with the domestic price
and interest variables orwith all five otherdomesticvariables, we almost
always reject the null hypotheses of no-domestic and no-other-country
causes.
These last results, therefore, suggest that there was a set of mechan-
isms by which disturbances were transmitted internationally. The results
say nothing, however, about either the relative importance ofthe differ-
ent variables in the different equations or the specific channels of trans-
mission.
We can get some notion of both by examining some of the other
single-equation test results. The price equations are particularlyinterest-
ing in both regards. Forthe United Kingdom as well as the United States
in both the weak and strong forms of the tests, own-country foreign
reserves and domestic credit as well as own-country rate of interest are
significantpredictorsofown-countrypricelevel. FortheU.K. price level,
Granger-causation results from the U.S. price level. A similar arbitrage
relationship appears to exist between interest rates in the two countries.
17
The U.S. rate Granger-causes the U.K. rate in both the weak- and
strong-form tests.
The results are consistent with the existence of a specie-flow channel
linking the two countries and, to a lesser extent, direct price and inter-
est-rate-arbitrage channels. They are, however, inconsistent with the
simplest model of the monetary approach to the balance of payments.
The model assumes that arbitrage is complete within the period, suggest-
ing, therefore, that the domestic price level either Granger-causes or is
contemporaneously correlated with money. Correspondingly, the model
views domestic credit as affecting only the stock offoreign reserves and
not the nominal money stock or the price level. More general models of
the types estimatedby Darbyand Stockman (1983) appearto be required
to describe the historical data.
The foreign-reserve and domestic-credit tests for the two countries
contain additional information bearing on these subjects. In the strong
tests (but not the weak) we find Granger-causation ofFRS by FRK. The
reverse relationship, however, does not hold. At the same time, we find
Granger-causation ofFRSby DeS. There is, therefore, a further sugges-
tion of a specie-flow channel as well as of a relation between domestic
credit and foreign reserves ofthe kind posited in a broad class of mone-
tary models. No consistency in these relationships between countries is,
however, shown. Moreover the direction of influence uncovered for491 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
foreign reserves, United Kingdom to United States, is the reverse ofthat
suggested by the price-level and interest-rate tests.
The remaining set of relationships that are of some interest are those
fordomesticcredit. U.K. realincome appearsto Granger-cause domestic
credit, being significant at the 5 percent level in the strong-form tests and
at close to the 10 percent level in the weak-form ones. The U.S. weak-
form tests give evidence ofGranger-causationofDCSby FRKandISand
perhaps also by DCKand PS. In the strong-form tests DCKand perhaps
IKGranger-cause DCS. OnepossibleinterpretationoftheU.K. results-is
in terms ofa reaction function ofthe BankofEngland. In the case ofthe
United States, which over this period had no central bank, what we may
be capturing are the effect of U.K. monetary pressures on the fiduciary
component of commercial-bank-note issues.
10.4.3 Further Tests of the Real-Income Relationship
As mentioned, a potential source ofbias in the real-income tests stems
from the way we entered the monetary variables. For both countries we
disaggregated high-powered money into domestic and foreign compo-
nents. By using high-powered money alone, we ignore any contribution
the money multiplier might have made. And to the extent that domestic
credit and foreign reserves are perfect substitutes in their effects on real
income, treating them separately may bias the case against finding Gran-
ger causation.
Testing the two monetary variables jointly would solve the second
problem but not the first. Accordingly, we reran the real-income tests
using U.S. M2 and U.K. high-powered money (the only measure avail-
able) in place ofthe othermonetary variables. We report the test results
based upon this model in table 10.8.
The results paint quite a different picture than the previous ones.
Unlike the earlier results, these show a clearcut association betwee~
own-country money and real income. In all four instances-YKvs. HK
and YSvs. MS, in bothforms ofthetest-wefind Grangercausationfrom
the monetary variable to income. The relationships, however, are not
simple. Other-country money also has significant effects both on own-
country money and on own-country real income in all the comparisons.
Similarly, for the United Kingdom there is evidence ofreverse causation,
YK having a significant effect on HK. We thus find what we failed to
establish in the earlier set of results. At the same time, additional evi-
dence emerges of a complex system of interaction between the two
countries operating through monetary channels.
The relations uncovered between other-country money and own-
country real income are particularly intriguing. Onepossible explanation
is that we are capturing with other-countrymoney the effect ofmonetary
shocks abroadonthe moneymultipliers and, hence, onreal incomein the492 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
Table 10.8 Additional Granger Tests: U.S.-U.K. Monetary Models, 1834-1914
1
Weak Tests Strong Tests Multiple Cause
Dependent Causing Causing Own Foreign
Variable Variable F Variable F Variables Variables
YS MS 5.01 MS 3.63 1.97 1.94
HK 6.80 HK 3.59
MS YS 3.49 YS 0.35 1.03 2.24
YK 0.02 YK 1.47
HK 4.27
YK HK 4.32 HK 3.30 1.91 1.71
MS 1.69 MS 4.02
HK YK 1.62 YK 4.52 2.51 1.46
YS 0.10 YS 1.23
MS 2.92
Degrees of freedom
for column 2, 50 2, 34 8,34 10,34
Critical F at
5% level 3.19 3.29 2.23 2.12
10% level 2.42 2.47 1.86 1.80
1. All equations included both an intercept and (1, 0) dummy variable for pre- and
post-Civil War years.
two countries. For the United Kingdom we have been forced to use
high-powered money alone, so this explanation is particularly plausible.
For the United States the deposit data for the antebellum period are
likely to be subject to substantial error. Movements in U.K. high-
powered money, therefore, may be a proxy for movements in the true
U.S. money stock that are not reflected in movements in the measured
money stock.
The alternative explanation is that the result is a reflection of some
underlying behavioralrelationship. Onepossibilityis thatthe two monies
were close substitutes from the standpoint ofdomestic money holders in
the two countries. In that case, the true money stock in each country
would be some weighted average of measured U.K. money and of
measured U.S. money, with the weights most likelyvarying from the one
country to the other. A further possibility is that we are capturing some
aspect of the adjustment mechanism linking the two countries, rather
than some aspect of a steady-state equilibium relationship such as cur-
rency substitution. Asset-market adjustment across a wider spectrum
than the short-term financial assets whose yields we include in the model
is a potential candidate.18
10.4.4 Conclusions from the Tests
Some of the explanation of results has been conjectural. In addition,
certain relationships appear implausible a priori; certain others appear493 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
inconsistent with findings that can be rationalized. Viewed as a whole,
however, the results do tell a story of simultaneous dynamic interaction
betweenthe UnitedKingdom and the United States thatin broadoutline
jibes with the inferences already drawn from the analysis ofthe data for
individual reference cycles. The monetary system appears to be of con-
siderable importance in the transmission mechanism. Monetary decel-
erations appear to be a significant determinant ofcyclical contractions in
real income. The evidence for monetary causes of transmission of busi-
ness cycles is strongest when money itself is included directly in the
econometric analysis. The analysis that allowed for cross-equation cor-
relation of the residuals indicates that there probably were additional
sources of transmission omitted from the model.
10.5 General Summary and Conclusions
In investigating the causes and transmission of cyclical fluctuations
under the gold standard, we pursued two different research strategies.
We began with an examination ofeach important cyclical episode on an
individual basis and focused that analysis on the cyclical behavior ofthe
monetary data, the cross-country interrelationships between movements
in the specie and money stocks of the two countries, and the
within-country interrelationships of those series and output. We then
proceeded to estimate vector-autoregressive macroeconomic models for
the United Kingdom and United States combined using variables that
alternative hypotheses about cyclical fluctuations and transmission dur-
ing this periodsuggest areimportant. We used themodelsin conductinga
series of Granger tests, appropriate to both sets of hypotheses.
Because the historical and the econometric exercises are largely com-
plementary, we have greater confidence in those findings that are com-
mon to the two approaches. Two items in particular deserve comment.
One item is the role ofmoney in cyclical contractions. Taken together
the two types of analysis indicate that monetary shocks were important
independent factors leading to orworsening the severity and duration of
the contractions in the two countries. During severe contractions,
moreover, the shocks appear to have been the most important causative
factor.
19
The other item is the part played by the gold standard in the process.
Both the historical and the econometric analyses point to it as a key
element in the transmission mechanism. Reestablishment ofthe equilib-
rium conditions of the system after a monetary shock in one country,
typically produced both gold flows and also price and capital-market
adjustments. These in turn induced cyclical fluctuations in output in the
other. Goldoutflows, moreover, were particularlyimportantin transmis-
sion, having two avenues of influence not only affecting high-powered494 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
money but also, in a considerable number of episodes, leading to finan-
cial crises and subsequent declines in the money multiplier.
The two types of analysis, separately and combined, also suggest a
number of other conclusions of less importance, which we merely list:
1. During the course of the sample period the United States and the
United Kingdom appear to have reversed their roles: the United King-
dom seems to have been the senior partner prior to 1860, the United
States in the first three decades of the twentieth century; neither was
clearly predominant during the intervening years.
2. Within those subperiods, however, causation was not geographi-
cally unidirectionaL Shocks initiated in one country,that spilled over to
the other appear to have reverberated back to the originating country to
greater or lesser degree depending upon the particular episode.
3. Within countries there is evidence of a similarly complex transmis-
sion mechanism. Income had feedback effects on money of at least
occasional and probably ofgeneral importance in both the United King-
dom and the United States.
4. During the relatively short periods when either the United King-
dom or United States was offgold, transmission ofcyclical fluctuations is
clearly less evident. Flexible exchange rates appear, therefore, to offer
some and perhaps a considerable degree of insulation against cyclical
contractions.
5. Short-term independence of monetary policy was possible even
underthegoldstandard. TheBankofEnglandoftenundertook defensive
actions that halted and then reversed specie outflows. Those actions, in
turn, appearto have hadsubsequent effects on income in bothcountries,
moderating the decline in the United Kingdom and aggravating the
decline in the United States.
Fromthese findings, we draw several conclusionsrelevant to monetary
policy. Given the attention the gold standard has received in the United
States in recent years, these findings deserve explicit mention. The ben-
efits of a gold standard, as usually enumerated, are that it is both au-
tomatic and impersonal and that it e~fectively constrains governments
from using money creation as a taxation device. Our analysis suggests
that the automaticity and impersonality were less than complete. The
Bank of England's intervention alluded to above was a prime example.
More important, because cyclical fluctuations were transmitted interna-
tionally with apparentease underthe gold standard, one has to weigh'the
costs of a greater incidence ofsuch fluctuations against the benefits of a
greater degree of secular price stability.495 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
Appendix A
The Data
United States: Individual Series and Sources
High-Powered Money. High-powered money is defined as the sum of
notes and specie held by the banks and the nonbank public. Data for
1833-59 are from Rutner 1974, table 28, col. 15 plus col. 19; for 1879-
1933 from-Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8, col. 9. Since Rutner's
data were reported for varying monthly bank-statement dates, we took
appropriate weighted averages of the original data to arrive at figures
approximately centered on the end of June.
Money. Money is defined as the sum ofcurrency (notes and specie) and
commercial-bank demand and time deposits held by the nonbankpublic.
Datafor 1833-59 are from Rutner 1974, table 57, col. entitled "Calendar
Year"; for 1870-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8,
col. 1.
Specie. Specie is defined as that held by banks and the nonbank public
plus specie held by the Treasury and, from 1914 on, the Federal Reserve.
Datafor 1833-59 are from Rutner 1974, table 28, col. 1, adjusted by us to
a yearly (June-centered) average; for 1879-1914 from Friedman and
Schwartz 1963a, tables 5 and 8; for the remaining years from worksheets
underlying Friedman and Schwartz 1963a.
Real Income. Data for 1833-59 are from the Smith and Cole index
describedbelow; for 1870-1933, real netnationalproductfrom Friedman
and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8, col. 3.
Price Index. Data for 1833-59 are from a yearly GNP deflator derived
from Gallman's benchmark estimates; for 1870-1933 from an NNP
deflator from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8, col. 4.
Interest Rate. Data are for commercial paper rates; for 1833-59 from
annual averages ofBigelow's monthly series in Macaulay 1938, appendix
table 25; for 1870-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8,
col. 6.
Population. Data for 1833-59 are linear interpolations of census-year
decennial estimates from Rutner 1974, table 37; for 1870-1933 from
Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.8, col. 5.496 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
United Kingdom: Individual Series and Sources
High-Powered Money. High-powered money is defined as the sum of
notes and coin held by the public plus bankers deposits and otherprivate
deposits at the Bank of England, 1833-70 from Huffman and Lothian
1980; for 1871-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.9, col. 9.
Money.' Money is defined as the sum of currency held by the public and
total deposit (current accounts and deposit accounts) at commercial
banks. Data for 1871-1933 are from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table
4.9, col. 1.
Specie. Specie is defined as the sum ofspecie held by the public and that
held by the Bank of England. Data for specie held by the public for
1833-70 come from Huffman and Lothian 1980; thereafter from unpub-
lished worksheets underlying the data reported in Friedman and
Schwartz 1982, table 4.9. Specie held by the Bank for 1833-1879 comes
from an unpublished appendix, "BankofEnglandLiabilities and Assets:
1696 to 1966," col. entitled "Assets. Coin and Bullion," to the article
with that title in the Bank ofEngland Quarterly Bulletin, June 1967, pp.
159-63; thereafter from Sheppard 1971, table A 1.12, col. 15.
Real Income. Real GNP is from Deane 1968 for 1833-1912; thereafter,
the'series is derived by us from Feinstein's (1972, table 7, col. 7) index of
real GNP at constant factor cost.
Price Index. Data are from the real-GNP series described above divided
by nominal GNP from Deane 1968 for 1833-1912; thereafter, from
Feinstein 1972, table 2, col. 10.
Interest Rates. Dataare for first-class three-month bills; for 1833-56from
Mitchell and Deane 1962; for 1857-67, ibid.; for 1868-1933 from Fried-
man and Schwartz 1982, table 4.9, col. 6.
Population. Datafor 1833-67arefrom Mitchell andDeane1968, p. 8; for
1868-1933 from Friedman and Schwartz 1982, table 4.9, col. 5.
Problems with the U.S. Output Data
As a measure ofreal output in the U.S. during the antebellum period,
we used an index derivedfrom Smith and Cole's (1935) separate produc-
tion indexes for the years 1831-45 and 1843-62.
Both indexes are made up of two components-domestic trade (two-
thirds weight) and foreign trade (one-third weight). The domestic index
for 1831-45 was derived from eleven component series, eight of which
were expressedin physical units; the domesticindexfor 1843-62from ten497 The Transmission of Business Cycles, 1833-1932
component series, six ofwhich were in physical units. The foreign trade
indexes were both nominal measures based on the total of exports and
imports in current prices in both periods. None ofourconclusions about
cyclical movements, however, would have been grossly different had we
relied solely on the domestic indexes. We linked the two production
indexes on the basis of Ayres's (1939) index of cyclical fluctuations.
The Smith and Cole indexes as published are in the form ofdeviations
from trend. Logarithmic first differences of these indexes, therefore,
overstatethedeclinein thenon-trend-adjustedseries. Theoverstatement
in the case ofa series that follows a constant semilogarithmic trend is the
intercept term in that trend equation.
In spite oftheir deficiencies, these indexes appeared far preferable to
the alternative measure of output we examined, an annual real-GNP
series derived from Robert Gallman's (1966) benchmark estimates. In-
spectionofthisseries revealedalmost no correspondencewith theNBER
reference cycles-even during the 1839-43 contraction which, by all
accounts bothcontemporaryandsubsequent, was unusuallysevere. Most
of the physical-volume series for individual industries we examined, in
contrast, did exhibit cyclical movements corresponding to the NBER
pattern as also did the Smith and Cole indexes. Onereasonfor the lack of
cyclical movement in the Gallman series may be its omission ofinventor-
ies, usually one of the most cyclically sensitive components of GNP.
Proxy Series for the U.K. Money Supply
Prior to 1870 the U.K. deposit data are incomplete. For a subset of
these years, though, we have a proxy series-total liabilities of private
and joint-stock bank in England and Wales to the nonbank public-that
Michael Collins (1981) has constructed. Movements in these data are
summarized in a note at the bottom of table 10.3.
Weview these data as indicatorsofthe direction butnot the magnitude
ofmovement ofthe overall money stock relative to that ofthe monetary
gold stock. We regard these data as suspect from the latter standpoint
because Collins was unable to obtain complete bank-balance-sheet data
for the whole period. As an interpolator, he used the number of bank
offices. In periods of banking panic when there were substantial bank
failures, his series may therefore be more volatile than the true series.
Appendix B
Panics and Cyclical Contractions
Discussions of financial panics abound in the literature devoted to
particular periods in the economic history ofeach country. More general498 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
treatments of financial panics, either from a primarily theoretical and
primarily historical standpoint, however, are few.
One group of modern studies that has dealt with the phenomenon of
financial panics in some depth are those ofthe U.S. monetary system at
the NationalBureau: MiltonFriedman andAnnaSchwartz'sA Monetary
History ofthe United States (1963a) and their related article "Moneyand
Business Cycles" (1963b), and especially Phillip Cagan's Determinants
and Effects ofChanges in the StockofMoney, 1875-1960 (1965). Charles
Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, andCrashes (1978) is amore recentwork
devoted to the study of such episodes in an explicitly international con-
text.
One of Cagan's specific concerns was the interrelation of cycles in
monetary growth and business. In a subsection of that title in the sum-
mary chapter of his study he concludes:
This evidence points to an important independent role of monetary
factors in severe business contractions. The six largest declines in
money were associated with severe depressions, and severe depres-
sions have never occurred otherwise....Panics cannot be held solely
responsible for the deep declines in both money and business. Two
severe contractions had no panic; in addition, some panics did not
produce a large drop in monetary growth, and the accompanying
declines in business did not become severe. (P. 296)
Kindleberger, though he does not refer to Cagan's study, apparently
would disagree with his assessment. InKindleberger'sframework, panics
are the natural culmination of the previous boom in which speculation
and overtrading are rife. An increase in the money supply may alleviate
the effects ofthe panic, but a decrease during the panic is not a necessary
condition for a severe cyclical downturn.
Cagan's conclusions about the effects ofpanics stem in large partfrom
the comparisons he makes between cycles that were severe and had no
panics and cycles that were not severe but had panics. Of four relevant
episodes-two in each category-he excludes two from consideration,
ending up with one in each category. Oursample extends farther back in
time than Cagan's and covers the United Kingdom as well as the United
States. Hence, it offers additional degrees offreedom with which we can
assess the relativ~ importance of panics and monetary contractions as
proximate causes of business contractions.
To that end table 10.A.1 classifies cyclical contractions in both coun-
tries according to both degree of severity (severe versus mild) and exis-
tence ofa banking panic. We exclude cycles that occupy the cell mild, no
panic. We further classify each ofthe cycles that we include according to
the degree of monetary contraction.
As a starting point in dividing the cycles according to degree ofsever-




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.500 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
1907, 1920, 1929 as severecycles for bothcountries. Forthe UnitedStates
we then added 1837, 1839, 1847, and 1882; and for the United Kingdom,
1839 and 1883. We had some doubts about the degree ofseverity of1837
and 1847 in the United States and their two counterparts in the United
Kingdom. On the basis of the output data in tables 10.2 and 10.3, we
classified thetwo U.S. cycles as severe andthecorrespondingU.K. cycles
as mild. Following Burns and Mitchell we did not include the 1913-14
contraction in the severe category. On the basis of the real output data
alone, the phase clearly was severe. Had we so classified it, the case we
make below would have been weakened but hardly overturned. More-
over, as Cagan (p. 223) points out, the phase is not very informative in
any event since the panic was a "rather mild affair."
By including both the United States and the United Kingdom in the
period prior to 1875, we have thirteen severe cyclical contractions in
addition to those Cagan examined-twelve accompanied by panics, one
not, and three additional mild cyclical contractions, none accompanied
by panics. As a glance at the table indicates, the deciding factor in a
cycle's severity is the existence or absence of a monetary contraction
rather than the existence orabsence ofa panic. Panics took place in only
ten ofeighteen severe cycles; severe monetarycontractions tookplace in
fifteen. In three of the five mild cycles during which a panic took place,
the monetary contraction was also mild, and in only one (1845 in the
United Kingdom) was there an absolute decline in money.
The other interesting aspect of these data is the light they shed on the
question of transmission. In only three of the common cycles-1836-38
(1837-38 in the United Kingdom), 1847-48 (1845-48 in the United
Kingdom), and 1856-58 (1857-58 in the United Kingdom)-were there
panics in bothcountries. In the first two, thefluctuations in outputwere a
good deal more severe in the UnitedStates than in the United Kingdom.
The importance of panics as a direct channel of transmission of cyclical
fluctuations does not appear to have been great. As an indirect channel,
that is through their effects on money supplies, panics appear to have
exerted a more important influence.
Notes
1. Considerable debate has centered on this topic. See Pippenger's paperin this volume
for evidence supporting this statement.
2. In Friedman and Schwartz's (1963a) studyofbusiness cycles, for example, changes in
monetary growth were the causative variable. Fisher (e.g., 1935) related cyclical move-
ments in real variables to distributed lags ofpast prices, the latterbeing identified by Fisher
as an indicator of monetary pressure.
3. For a discussion of transmission in the Meade-Mundell framework see Mussa's
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4. See Darby and Lothian 1983 for a discussion of how these various channels of
transmission operated during the fixed-exchange-rate Bretton Woods period.
5. In appendix B we evaluate these two hypotheses. We conclude that the monetary
decline, rather than the panic itself, was the major factor leading to cyclical contractions in
output.
6. Ifthe speciecircularhadbeenthecause ofthe monetarycontraction,we would expect
to see the ratio of money to specie rather than specie itself account for the decline in
monetary growth.
7. Between 1876 and 1879, the money stock decreased at an average annual rate of2.6
percent while high-powered money increased at an average annual rate of 1.7 percent.
8. Ultimately, however, some reductionin theU.K. moneysupplyand pricelevelwould
have had to occur given the reduction in both the United States and the rest ofthe world. A
largely domestic-induced decrease in the money stock in this instance was the equilibrating
factor. Had the decrease not occurred, an outflow ofgold presumablywould have been the
main avenue through which monetary deflation would have taken place.
9. We stress the word "almost." The onset of the 1920-21 cycles poses a partilcular
problem in this regard. Both countries experienced substantial monetary decelerations
beginning at roughly the same time. The increase in the discount rate by the Federal
Reserve and subsequent reaction by the Bank of England may have been the key factor
here.
10. See Choudhri and Kochin 1980 for evidence drawn from a number of countries
during the 1930s andJonung 1981 for Sweden. Lothian 1981 contains afurther discussion of
the U.K. vs. U.S. comparisons presented here.
11. In the presentation and discussion of the empirical results, we concentrate ex-
clusively on the Granger tests. An autoregressive system is difficult to describe succinctly.
Moreover, it is difficult to make much sense of individual coefficients of the regressions
equations since coefficients on successive lagged values ofa given variable tend to oscillate
in sign, and there tends to be a complicated pattern ofcross-equation feedback. Additional
insights into the performance ofthe system ofequations could be obtainedby analyzing the
system's responses to typical random shocks.
12. Cassese and Lothian 1982 contains a discussion ofsome ofthese issues, in particular
the relation between timing and causation in the context of international transmission of
economic disturbances. C. Hernandez-Iglesias and F. Hernandez-Iglesias (1981) provide
examples of models where economic causality may be difficult to verify with tests based
upon Granger's predictive concept of causality.
13. The F-statistic is fairly robust to relaxing the assumption of normality ofthe errors
(Judge et al. 1980). Estimation and testing with lagged endogenous variables rely on
asymptotic distribution theory. Autocorrelatederrorterms are aserious potentialsource of
problems.
14. Dhrymes (1970, pp. 34-40) presents the basic form of the test. Under the null
hypothesis, we impose q linear restrictions on the coefficients of 1T(L). Applying the
likelihood-ratio principle, we then arrive at the test statistic (T - k) 1nI!oo/!nI, which has
an asymptotic X~ distribution where !oo and !n are estimates of the variance-covariance
matrix ofthe errorterms underthe restrictedsystem associatedwith the null hypothesis and
ofthe generalsystem respectively. Thisform ofthestatisticis due to Sims (1980) who argues
that standard tests are biased toward rejecting the null hypothesis when q approaches or
exceeds T - k in size. Hetherefore suggests treating the sample size as (T - k) rather than
T in these cases.
15. Ideally we would have liked to have had quarterly or perhaps even monthly data.
Annual data can of course mask the timing relationships that are central to our analysis.
Unfortunately, however, no such intrayear data are available in continuous form for
anything even close to our full sample period.502 Wallace E. Huffman and James R. Lothian
16. Tests presented in the earlierversion ofthis paperbased on a slightly different body
ofdata indicated possible heterogeneity ofthe model across these two subperiods. Forthis
reason, we includedthe dummy variable in each of the equations. Additional tests of lag
length were not inconsistent with the two-year distributed lags used here.
17. Since only lagged values of the variables appear on the right-hand side of the
equations, these tests are likely to understate the importance ofthe arbitrage relationships.
We therefore ran additional regressions, in the first case, ofthe contemporaneous percent-
age change in one country's price level on the other's and, in the second, ofthe contempo-
raneous first difference oftheonecountry'sinterestrateontheother's. Inbothinstanceswe
also included a dummy variable for intercept shift in the second subperiod. The partial
correlation between the price variables was .41 and between the interest-rate variables .52.
Both are significant at better than the .01 level.
The statistical significance uncovered in certain ofthe Granger tests, however, suggests
that neither process was complete within the year. For the interest-rate relationship the
lagged adjustment is suggestive of an asset-market transmission mechanism of the type
positedby Branson (1968, 1970). Fortheprice relationship, differencesin the adjustmentof
prices oftraded and nontraded goods are a possible explanation. Lags in adjustment in the
goods and the bond markets, togetherwith the successful intervention techniques followed
by the Bank of England, suggest that the simplest monetary-approach models are in-
appropriate for the period. Similar conclusions for both the United States and the United
Kingdom, as well as six other industrial countries during the post-World War II era, are
presented in Darby and Lothian 1983.
18. Brittain 1981 and Miles 1978 contain evidence derived from post-WorldWarIIdata
for the U.S. and several other industrial countries and the U.S. and Canada, respectively,
thatis consistentwith thecurrency-substitutionhypothesis. Darbyand Lothian, in summar-
izing the findings ofthe National Bureau study The International Transmission ofInflation
(1983), present evidence that largely contradicts it. In their study of the United Kingdom
and UnitedStates, FriedmanandSchwartz (1982) find for the gold standardportionoftheir
period that other-country money did not affect own-country nominal income in either
instance but did affect the own-country price level in both. Since their data are averages
taken over reference-cycle phases, the possibility ofshorter-term effects on nominal (and
real) income exists. Further compounding the problem is the evidence they present that
such effects were significant for the United Kingdom but not for the United States post-
1914. The standard comment that further study of the question is required is, therefore,
more appropriate than usual.
19. Friedman and Schwartz 1963 for the United States after 1870, Warburton 1958 and
1962 for the U.S. antebellum period, Huffman and Lothian 1980 for the UnitedKingdom in
the nineteenth century contain results consistent with this conclusion.
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Comment Michael Connolly
The major finding of this study is that for each country the proximate
determinant ofoutput fluctuations are sudden, unanticipated changes in
domestic monetaryvariables. Transmission betweencountriesoccursvia
specie flows and the monetaryreactions they induce, eitheronthepartof
the monetary authorities or on the part of the banking system.
In my comments, I will argue that some evidence, particularly of the
historical-narrative kind, is provided in support ofthis finding. But I am
less convinced by the econometric evidence.
Evidence on Real-Income Interdependence
Two bodies of evidence are offered in support of the international
transmission of business cycles. The first is an anecdotal narrative ofthe
majorcontractionsin the UnitedStatesandthe UnitedKingdomoverthe
one hundred-yearperiod; the second is econometric, involving Granger-
Sims autoregressive tests of causality for the combined period 1837-59,
1882-1914.
The historical narratives are to some extent convincing, the econ-
ometric testing is less so. The major U.K. recessions were transmitted to
the United States, it is argued, during the antebellum period, principally
by the UnitedKingdom's raising Bankrate, thus triggering aslowdownof
growth or an outright loss ofgold in the United States. Each recession is
documented andwas frequently sharedby bothcountriesduring this gold
standard period.
The extent to which recessions were transmitted from the United
Kingdom to the United States, however, is undoubtedly exaggerated by
the use of the Smith and Cole and the Ayres indexes of total trade for
U.S. income from 1833 to 1861. As described in appendix A, these
indexes contain two-thirds domestic trade and one-third foreign trade.
This series is much too volatile and, more importantly, very likely to be
biased toward procyclical movements with U.K. income. The reason is
simple: When the rate of growth of U.K. income expands or contracts,
Michael Connolly is professor of economics at the University of South Carolina.508 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
U.K. imports from the United States will expand or contract. Conse-
quently, the U.S. outputindexwill, I suspect, reflect toodramaticallythe
decline in U.K. income simply because it includes such a high proportion
of foreign trade. These problems are illustrated in figure C10.1 which I
have drawn from data supplied by Wallace Huffman and James Lothian
(hereafter H-L). Expansions and contractions in the U.K. growth rate
are accompanied by multiplied expansions and contractions in the U.S.
growth rate the same yearora yearlater. Personally, I suspect a problem
with the U.S. income index, although I agree with H-L that the Gallman
index is unsuitable since it excludes inventories, a particularly sensitive
boom-and-slump item. In any event, to the extent that the U.S. output
index is biased towards procyclical behavior, the findings will be also.
I will not review each contractionary episode and the extent to which
H-L argue it was shared under the gold standard. In most cases it is clear
recessions were shared; in othersit is notso clear. I am puzzled, however,
by their interpretation of the "controlled experiment" of the 1915-25
interwar preiod when the United Kingdom was off the gold standard.
Following the sharp 1919-21 U.K. slump, U.S. income fellS percent in
1920 and4percentin 1921, suggestingthattheUnitedStatessharedin the
slump despite the nonexistence of the gold standard. It may be that the
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economic rebound was weaker and came later. But the fact is that both
economies slumped together-the United States was not insulated from
the British drive to restore the gold standard at the prewar parity by
deflation. I amconvincedby mostofthenarrativestories, butin somethe
authors use poetic license.
As for the weak Granger-Sims causality tests reported in table 10.5,
there appear to be some relationships between U.S. income and price
variables and U.K. income and price variables. U.S. real-income growth
is Granger-caused by U.K. monetary variables (gold, Bank rate, and
high-powered money), but not by U.S. gold nor U.K. income. In turn
U.K. income growth is Granger-caused by U.S. high-powered money,
prices, and discount rate, but surprisingly not by U.K. prices or Bank
rate. The strong causality tests reported in table 10.6 show U.S. income
Granger-caused by only U.K. prices and U.S. population growth. U.K.
incomeis notGranger-causedby anyvariable. These testshaveproblems
to which I will return.
Evidence on the Transmission Mechanism
In general, two types of transmission mechanisms are possible: one
through the direct effects of international-price and interest-rate arbi-
trage, the otherthroughflows ofspecie andconsequenteffects onmoney
growth rates. The first is not tested in this paper because the autoregres-
sive tests impose a one-yearlag onvariablesforthepurposeofidentifying
causality. Since synchronous variables are excluded, the test cannot pick
up rapid arbitrage. Inthe H-Ltests, U.S. inflation is notrelated tolagged
U.K. inflation, butU.K. inflationis weaklycausedby pastU.S. inflation.
Similarly, changes in U.S. interest rates are not Granger-caused by
lagged changes in U.K. interest rates, but changes in U.K. Bankrate are
weakly caused by changes in lagged U.S. interest rates. Not much in-
formation on arbitrage can be drawn from this evidence because of the
long lags involved.
To get at some ofthese relationships, it might be useful to use a priori
information on the direction ofcausation to justify the inclusion ofsome
contemporaneous variables. For example, the authors argue that con-
tractionspriorto 1870intheUnitedStatesare adancetothetuneofU.K.
Bank rate.
In clearcut cases, contemporaneous U.K. income, prices, and Bank
ratemight beincludedin the regressionsofU.S. income. (Choudhri 1983
uses this technique.) In any event, this would give greater evidence of
association if not causality and, in particular, would shed light on the
price- and interest-arbitrage relationship.
Thenarrative evidence presentedfor 1833-70focuses upon the impor-
tance of jumps in U.K. Bank rate in inducing slowdowns or declines in
U.S. specie and consequently in U.S. money growth, which then slows510 Wallace E. HutTman and James R. Lothian
u.s. income. A glance at figure CIO.2, also reproducedfrom H-L's data,
does suggest this pattern in the antebellum period. Declines in U.K.
specie led to increases in Bankrate, provoking shortly thereaftereithera
slowdown or decline in U.S. specie. In the 1836-37 period, U.S. gold
growth slowed; in 1840 it declined7percent; it slowed in 1857 and in 1882
and declined 4percentin 1889. In the GreatContraction, the U.K. break
with gold in September 1931 probably enabled money growth to expand
theresoonerand more rapidly (see figure C10.3). This type ofevidence is
quite strong-in many of the major contractions, the slowdowns and
declines in U.S. gold had similar effects on the U.S. money supply. In
H-L's terms, however, the movements in gold often fail to account for
anything close to the full movement in M2. Furthermore, in several
instances there was little correspondence between gold and M2, as re-
ported in tables 10.2 and 10.3. Nevertheless the evidence they report on
some specific episodes appears quite strong.
I would like to conclude with some remarks on the possible pitfalls of
the autoregressive tests reported in the H-L paper. First, as mentioned
above, lagged relationships using annual data suppress too much in-
formation and do not allow for rapid price and interest arbitrage and/or
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Fig. CI0.2 U.S. and U.K. annual percent change in monetary gold stock,
1834-1933. The United States was not on the gold standard
1861-79; the United Kingdom was not on the gold standard
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causation. tests. Second, reporting only the F-statistic, as is common in
these tests, gives us no idea about the magnitude or even the sign ofthe
coefficients in the regressions (on this, see note 11). Third, as specified,
the test clearly picks up spurious causality; for example, U.S. population
growth Granger-causes U.K. domestic-credit growth, and U.S. domes-
tic-credit growth causes U.K. population growth.
To sum up, I found the paper interesting and some of the evidence
convincing.
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